The Enchiridion
Epictetus
Updated Edition for Modern Readers
First published c. 125 · Lucid Classics edition 2026 · 34 pages
Original and Lucid edition, side by side
Higginson translation, 1865
Remember, then, that if you attribute freedom to things by nature dependent and take what belongs to others for your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you take for your own only that which is your own and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you; you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.
Aiming, therefore, at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself any inclination, however slight, toward the attainment of the others; but that you must entirely quit some of them, and for the present postpone the rest.
Lucid Classics
Remember this: if you treat dependent things as if they were free, or what belongs to others as your own, you will be hindered, you will grieve, you will be upset, you will blame both gods and men.
But if you claim as your own only what is truly yours, and see what belongs to others for what it really is, then no one will ever compel you and no one will restrict you. You will find fault with no one, accuse no one, do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemy, you will suffer no harm.
Since you are aiming at such great things, remember: you cannot allow yourself even the slightest pull toward the other things. Some you must give up entirely. Others you must postpone for now.
Higginson translation, 1865
Is a certain man your father? In this are implied taking care of him, submitting to him in all things, patiently receiving his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is your natural tie, then, to a good father? No, but to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, preserve your own just relation toward him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own will in a state conformable to nature, for another cannot hurt you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you consent to be hurt. In this manner, therefore, if you accustom yourself to contemplate the relations of neighbor, citizen, commander, you can deduce from each the corresponding duties.
Lucid Classics
Is this man your father? Then it is implied that you should care for him, defer to him in all things, bear with his reproaches and his corrections patiently. “But he is a bad father.” Is your natural tie, then, to a good father? No—to a father.
Is your brother unjust? Then maintain your own just relation toward him. Do not consider what he does, but what you are to do to keep your will in line with nature. For no one else can hurt you unless you allow it. You are hurt the moment you agree to be.
In the same way, if you train yourself to think through your relations as neighbor, citizen, commander, you can derive from each one the duties that correspond to it.